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What is Modernity? Where and how did it start? To answer these que-
stions we shall go back and take a look at the structure of traditional 
Greek and christian thought and life. Then, Modernity will appear in a 
better light.
ǡǡƤ-
templative life and theory. These are the ways to understand the me-
taphysical foundations of the world. Modernity will confront this me-
taphysics. Thus Cartesian thought, which marks the beginning of 
modern philosophy, confronts the metaphysics of the objective world. 
Even when talking about the I which thinks, Descartes doesn’t yet open 
the way to another metaphysics which will mark Modernity, and is 
called the metaphysics of subjectivity. He confronts the traditional me-
ƤǤ
it tells us about the world is not speculation anymore, but natural sci-
ǤƤ-
dern world. At the bottom we have the laws of science, physics, and no 
metaphysics. Obviously, questions may arise – how will metaphysics 
return? Another explicit question is how will philosophy itself return. 
Following science, post-Cartesian philosophy got linked to a name – 
rather unfortunate I would say – epistemology, the name that marks the 
near disappearance of philosophy at the beginning of Modernity. What 
would this new modern philosophy be?
These are the questions with which to begin the discussion about Mo-
ǤƤǤ
that sense, they do not represent the historical path of Modernity. In 
other words, the confrontation with theory is not the beginning of Mo-
dernity. And, as Buckhardt says, Modernity appears in Italy and Italian 
cities in the 13th century. It is a Modernity linked to practical processes 
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developing at the time. Perhaps this progress of the practice may explain 
ƤƥǤ
that is being installed is not the practice of the Aristotelian system. We 
could recollect this other moment of the traditional thought structure. 
After the articulation of theory comes the reconstruction of the practi-
cal, which the Greeks see as getting closer to the speculation basis. Thus 
ƥ-
derstood as a political consequence of a philosophical reasoning about 
the primacy of the general. This explicit connection with metaphysics 
and theory determines, as we already know, the structure of practice. 
Thus, following theory and talking explicitly about the primacy of the 
general, Aristotle will separate the private world of economy from the 
public world of ethics, politics and law. The modern change began the-
re, tied to this relationship between the private and public, or rather, be-
gan with the economy. Perhaps that is the historic beginning of Moder-
nity. The realization of economy is ever more explicit. Or even better, it 
is ever more explicit that the economy is leaving the private sphere, and 
that it is being realized in the public sphere. Today our public world is 
economic, but it was not like that for the Greeks. The economy belon-
ged only to the slaves, the family, and to the private. How did this chan-
ge happen, then? How did the economy leave the private and determin 
the public? According to Buckhardt’s thesis, the economy establishes 
itself as early as the beginning of the 13th century. It supports the Cru-
sades, which will bring changes to the European social map. Many new 
towns are founded, for example, and new market conditions are created. 
However, perhaps it was not Catholicism that initiated the progress of 
economy and capitalism. Max Weber’s theory suggests it was Protestan-
tism. With Protestantism, economic development will gain a religious 
ƤǤ Ǥ 
belongs exclusively to slaves, creating the conditions for the economy to 
leave the private and move into the sphere of the public. A new space is 
created between the private and the public, and we can call it social spa-
ce. It doesn’t exist in traditional life. The only question is how and when 
this new social space becomes visible to thought. The economy is de-
veloping, conquering the world, and philosophy is not saying anything 
ǡǤǡƤ
autism regarding the social. Descartes, for example, is going to tell us 
that dealing with the social and history is almost a waste of time. When 
will thought deal with this appearance of the social? These are the que-
stions which take us to jusnaturalism and later to German idealism.
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So, the classic structure of practice changed. The economy has left the 
private. And the public structure also changed. The ethics is no longer, 
as Machiavelli teaches, the presumption of politics. It does not bring 
us closer, as Aristotle thought, to the common good. It returns ever 
more to the private and our private convictions. This becomes clear, for 
example, in David Hume’s discussions on knowledge, where it remains 
unclear how to talk about moral objectivity. The ethics goes to the pri-
vate sphere. Even today we have doubts and expectations about the new 
relation between the ethics and politics, about its possible resurgence 
in public. The politics are deprived of an ethical orientation and per-
haps delivers itself to the dictate of economy, just like law. At one point 
Habermas says that the law did not understand its own possibility in 
the modern world and, instead of asserting the democratic processes it 
ƤǤ
remain in the cage of Modernity itself, a thing that Max Weber already 
sees very clearly. These are the questions that come afterwards, but are 
nevertheless important. How to articulate the modern social, and how 
to colonize the social world? But the questions are the ones with which 
we can better relate to the attempts to confront the social – and this is 
the case of jusnaturalism and of German idealism. 
So both theory and practice have changed. Where and how this hap-
pens – these are precisely the possibilities to understand the breaks and 
  Ǥ   ơǡ 
just a new word, but a reference to this break. Modern theory appears, 
ǦơǤ-
onal structure does not speak anymore about the foundations of the 
world and does not even give us a safe orientation in it.
ơǤǡǯ
Treaty on Painting is illustrative. At one point he says that the painting 
   ȋ ͥͥ͢͝ǣ ͝͠ȌǤ  
Greek mimesisǡǤ-
ǣȋǤȌǤ
ǤǤƤ
being imitated, open for the eyes. Truth may be on the surface. That is 
ǡǡƤ-
Ǥǯ
beginning of Modernity.
But we cannot understand Modernity as the rejection of profound 
questions. What is a human being? The question reappears. It is the 
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beginning of modern jusnaturalism, not inspired by our duties, but by 
our nature and our individuality. It remains an open question whether 
the realization of the individual, announced at the beginning of Moder-
ǡǤƤǫ
	ȋ
ͥͥͣ͝ǣ ͟͝ȌǤ  Ǥ
ǡǡ
Ǥ
path. Descartes tells us about the truth of the objective world, of nature. 
And marginalizes, in a certain way, the social. What is the truth of the 
ǫ ǯǤǯ
the responses of jusnaturalism and let’s try to understand the possible 
confrontation between jusnaturalism and German idealism.
The word freedom stands at the beginning of the discussion. When tal-
ơǡ
will say that this word separates two worlds. The traditional world is mo-
ral, and the modern world is free. This word also stands at the beginning 
of Hobbes’ jusnaturalism. We are free by nature. The question that rema-
ins open is how will German idealism, in order to explain our freedom, 
ǤǯƤ-
turalism, but its break becomes visible. At the beginning there is the hu-
man being and its freedom. In this way we can understand the modern 
world as a promise of realization of the human being. Why did this not 
happen? Why, as I asked, did Modernity not deliver on its own promise? 
But the break becomes visible. The discussion starts with the human be-
ing, and not with the metaphysics of nature. The nature in question is 
the one of the human being itself. And it points to our freedom and equ-
ǤƤǡǡ
worlds. Freedom can be found only at the end of the discussion, and it is 
inequality that Aristotle uses as a concept that does not need to be que-
Ǥǣǡǡ
to realize our nature? Does the state realize us, for example. Discussing 
ơ-
ces between the absolutist, liberal, and democratic states. These will pre-
ơǡǤ
Hobbes himself has doubts regarding this point. We are free by na-
ture, but this doesn’t mean that freedom is automatically realized in 
the forms of social life. Freedom, moreover, causes problems, since we 
all Ǥƪǡ
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theme of Leviathan. So, the only way is to give up the rights we have, or 
better put, transfer our rights to an authority. Or better yet, renounce 
our natural rights in order to survive. This is the beginning of the fa-
mous jusnaturalistic theory of social contract. The reason for the con-
tract is pure calculation – how to survive. The ultimate goal, says Ho-
ǡǲƤǡȑǥȒ
ǳȋͥͣͥ͝ǣ͜͟͝ȌǤͱ We have to ask ourselves how yet to 
think of another theory of reason, beyond the calculation, and the res-
ponse awaits for us in the German idealism.
In the State of Nature only the moral arguments speak about the hu-
man being, but we also have violence. We have, then, to overcome the 
ǡƤ-
macy of the State in it. Hobbes thinks that only laws can guarantee a 
ǤƤơ-
bbes. On one side the jusnaturalism, and on the other positivism.Ͳ Ju-
snaturalism is the inspiration, but the justice comes from positive laws 
and political authority. The contract marks the break between natural 
and civil law, between nature and the state, between the moral and the 
political. The crowd in the State of Nature still does not create another 
political inspiration – which will begin with Spinoza, and extend to the 
present day in the works of Negri. The crowd is the subjectivity that 
cannot alienate its own power by assassinating the contract. Natural 
and civil rights cannot be confronted. These are the messages that come 
even from Spinoza. The people, the crowd still don’t appear as consti-
tuents in Hobbes, even though they are making the contracts. And Ho-
ǣ ǲ	 -
sent in the observation of justice, and other laws of nature, without a 
common power to keep them all in awe, we might as well suppose all 
mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to 
be, any civil government or Commonwealth at all, because there wo-
Ǥǳȋͥͣͥ͝ǣ͜͝͠Ȍ
means thinking about power, and not the possibility. The multitude has 
1 ǣȀȀǤǤǤȀȀȀȀͤ͢Ȁ
ͣ͝ǤǤ
2 Several works of Norberto Bobbio could be quoted related to this matter. I think 
 Ǥƥ
appear with Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophy. I think that Bobbio perhaps didn’t under-
ơ
and idealism. This explains a certain lack of coherence in Bobbio’s books, where said 
ǡǡȋǤǡǤǡ
ǡ ǡ͜͜͜͞ǡǤͣ͜Ȍ
ȋǡǤͣ͟͝ȌǤ
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to overcome itself and, transferring its own rights, unite in one person 
called the State. The one who is the bearer of this person, says Hobbes, 
“is called the sovereign, and said to have sovereign powerǤǳȋǤǣ͜͢͝Ȍ
The sovereignty is of the State and we will see if there will be changes of 
this concept in the context of the jusnaturalist discussion. Is it possible, 
for example, to imagine sovereignty of the people on this modern path 
ǫǫ
In this reconstruction I will follow the arguments proper to jusnatura-
lism, thus coming to Hegel and to another perspective of Modernity. I 
deem that it is Hegel who makes it clear what ultimately is the truth of 
the modern social which we are looking for. Hegel will also show that we 
ƤǯǤ
searching for another theory about the human being and the reason we 
can overcome both. Jusnaturalism and positivism do not represent the 
only two alternatives of modern political thought.ͳ Obviously, another 
possibility, the third one, could be Spinoza’s path. I will leave this recon-
struction and a possible confrontation between Hegel and Spinoza for 
another occasion.
Hobbes is aware of the consequences of the argument itself. Freedom is 
in the beginning, and our safety in the end, or to put it better, the con-
ditions of our servitude. Where did the freedom from the beginning 
of Modernity disappear? How to recover it in its own social context? 
Obviously these are still questions for us. I already mentioned once that 
ƤǤʹ Even 
today, in order to survive terrorism, we have to accept another autho-
ritarian state called the United States, which the Bible fortunately still 
ǡȋ͠͝ȌǤ-
tion is a form of colonization of the world. The example of my country, 
former Yugoslavia, is explicit. The winner of the last war that happened 
there were not the particular states, which split from Yugoslavia. They 
all lost their autonomy and identity. The winners of the war were the 
American and European corporations.
Ǥǫ
ǡ-
Ǥ
3 
	ǡ±ǡ ǡͥͤ͝͠Ǥ
4 ͞ ͜͜͠ǣ͢ ͠Ȃ͢͡ǡǣ͞ ͜͜͞ǣ͟ ͠Ȃ͠͞Ǥ
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Ǥǡ
right to self-preservation. The State of Nature is not the State of War. In 
Ƥ-
bbes. It is the property that can already be found in the State of Natu-
Ǥ
ǡǲǣ
condition of human life, which requires labour and materials to work 
ǡǤǳȋͥͥ͝͝ǣ͟͜͞Ȍ͵ God 
Ǥ
return to this measure of property by the extent of work and the politi-
cal consequences.
If man is so free in his natural state, why would he give up this freedom, 
Ǥǣ
Ǥ-
ssion with jusnaturalist assumptions, but wants to see these assumpti-
ons realized. This makes him, we could agree with Bobbio, “a jusnatura-
Ǥǳȋͥͥͣ͝ǣͣ͡Ȍ
ȋ͝ ͥͥ͝ǣ
͢͞͠ȌǤ	ǡǤǡ
decision, also lack, because in this state every person “hath a right to 
ơǡǤǳȋǤȌ
is also missing, “many times, the power to sustain and support the sen-
ǡǤǳȋǤȌ
are the reasons to think about the idea of the State, based, again, on the 
Ǥǡǡǡ
this process. The state is the continuation of our nature. We only have 
ǤǲǤǤǤȑȒǡ
passion and revenge will carry them too far in the cases which interest 
ǤǤǤǳȋǤȌƤ
in the State of Nature. There would be no sense in leaving the State of 
Nature if we would lose something that we had in it. It is wrong, says 
ǡǡǲ-
me power of any community can make whatever is their will and dispo-
se of property of the subjects arbitrarily, or take any part of them at own 
ǳȋǤǣͣ͞͝ȌǤǡ
Ǥƥǡ
ǡǫƥ
ǫǡǡ
5 English text taken from ǣȀȀǤǤǤȀȀȀȀͤ͝Ȁ-
te.html.
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ǡǤ
these questions.
In the civil state freedom is linked to laws. Where there is no law, says 
ǡȋǤǣͤ͟͞ȌǤ-
te the guarantees for our natural rights, and those guarantees cannot be 
Ǥ-
ǣǡǤ
appears because the State itself, as a result of our consensus or contract, 
Ǥ-
Ƥ-
nal state, with separation of powers.
ǡǡȋǤǣͤ͟͜ȌǤ
enter society in order to preserve it. If this did not happen, we would 
Ǥǡ
ǡȋǤǣ͟͜͝ȌǤ-
Ǥǲ
right to resistance is no longer an unprotected natural right, but a pro-
ǡǮǯǳȋ͜͜͜͞ǣ
͟͢ȌǤǤǡ
rights of preservation of life and property, the contract in the sense of a 
consensus which founds the State, the power which is not authoritarian, 
ǡǯ
argument. Or, in other words, the principal points of the elaboration of 
ǤSecond Treatise of Civil Government as 
ȋǤǣͥ͡ȌǤ
ǡͤͤ͢͝ȋͥͥͣ͝ǣ͢͝͝ȌǤ
Questions about labor and the assumptions of liberal democracy remain 
Ǥǯ-
tion. We saw that the economy was long marginalized by philosophy. In 
the traditional world it doesn’t reach the public sphere nor the conditi-
ons to achieve the common good. The perspective did not change in Mo-
dernity, despite tremendous economic progress progress. Even though 
being the determining factor in the public sphere, the economy still does 
ƪǤơ-
Ǥ
ǡSecond Treatise, has given to men 
ȋͥͥ͝͝ǣ
ͥ͞͞ȌǤǡǡextent of 
ȋǤǣ͟͜͞ȌǤǡǡǡ-
ǡ     Ǥ   
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does not start the discussion about the labor structure itself. What is, for 
example, the basis of modern manufacturing and modern work organi-
zation? These questions return only with the Marxist discussion. In that 
sense, Marx will understand labor as, we might say, a certain social on-
tology. Work constitutes the social world. Hegel already understood this 
constitutive role of work, with which nature changes and becomes the 
historical world of the human being. This constitutive role still remains 
visible under the metaphysical assumptions in, for example, the Pheno-
menology of the SpiritǤǤ
This also has consequences for the second question I mentioned, about 
the liberal assumptions of politics. Work is the extent of property, and 
property determines the conditions of political participation. Obviou-
Ǥ
idea of political equality, or a democratic theory. Nor does he talk about 
slavery of black people, for example. It seems obvious, as Bobbio conclu-
des, that “the political rights should be granted to all citizens, and not 
Ǥǳȋ͜͜͜͞ǣ͡͡Ȍ-
usseau understood very well. This is why we can already understand 
his theory as the possibility of articulating the idea of the Democratic, 
ǡǤǡǡ
about the people and it even seems that he understands people as a cer-
tain political subjectivity. The people released from subjection, the well 
being of people - are some examples of this. Even other commentators 
ƤǤǲǡǡ
say that the sovereign is the people and that this makes for a popular so-
Ǥǳȋͤ͜͜͞ǣ͝͠͠Ȍǡǡ
because it creates the mistaken impression that the liberalism already 
articulates the possibilities of democracy. Today, even, we are the wit-
nesses of the existence of several liberal-democratic parties. These two 
ǤǤ 
ǡǡǡ
ǤǤ
we have to ask ourselves whether the modern world is capable of im-
plementing democracy, the equality announced in the premises of ju-
snaturalism. The Marxist readings point to a deep modern world con-
tradiction between labor and the capital, which has a consequence of 
deep social polarization. The simple message is – not all of us can earn 
money and be rich in capitalism. Capitalism does not allow for univer-
salization, also understood in the sense of theory of democracy. At the 
bottom, as Marx sees it, and his diagnosis is still valid today, we have 
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a confrontation, and not conditions for universalization. What can be 
universalized in capitalism?
 ǡ-
termined by God, and liberal results. Not analyzing the assumptions, 
which become obvious in the question of the idea of labor, he does not 
come far in the attempt to think of a new sovereignty, perhaps of the pe-
ople. In the end, his world is of individuals. God and individuals, to put 
it better. Obviously it is not clear how to think in this context about the 
idea of the common world.
I remember that during the war in my country, former Yugoslavia, I was 
asked several times something like, OK, you criticize the communism, 
we can understand that because of the totalitarian heritage of commu-
nism. You criticize nationalism. We can understand that as well, be-
   ƥǤ
capitalism? The answer becomes visible even in the context of this dis-
Ǥ-
tic coexistence. Capitalism only wants to function by liberating us, so to 
say, from ourselves. The foundation is not discussed, as the question of 
ǤǡǡƤ-
stitute the common world. Is democracy still possible? And is it possi-
ble within Modernity? It seems like an attempt that fails at the very be-
ǤǯƤǯǤ
   ǡ ǡ   
freedom in the Natural State. But the reconstruction of the Natural Sta-
ơǤ-
ons of competition and war, as Hobbes thinks. Actually “the men in this 
State of Nature, not having among themselves any kind of moral rela-
ǤǤǤǳȋ-
ͥͤ͟͝ǣ͞͡͝ȌǤǯ
the political consequences. We saw that this inspiration still strengthens 
Hobbes’ perspective against positivism. The Natural State is characteri-
zed by the attempt of self-preservation, and, we could say, a certain se-
ǦƥǤǡ
ȋǤǣͤ͞͝ȌǤǤ-
te. It disappears with civil society and with the introduction of property. 
ǡǤ
It is something that comes later and seems to be the cause of the evils 
in history. It is the beginning of inequality. This confrontation of natu-
re and culture and the diagnose of malaise in the culture will determine 
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many discussions. It is also the beginning of another relationship of man 
ǡǦǣ
ǲǦǢơ
ơǤǦ-
timent that makes every animal zeal for its own survival and which, in 
a man guided by reason and changed by pity, causes humanity and vir-
ǤǡƤ
in the society, which makes every person care about himself more than 
about anyone else, which inspires men to all evils that they cause to each 
ǤǤǤǳȋǤǣͣ͟͜ȌǤ
ǡƤ
a certain articulation of the common life. But the message is dramatic – 
Ǥǡǣ
“The ‘false lights’ of civilization, far from illuminating the human world, 
scumble the natural transparency, separate men from each other, make 
interests private, destroy any possibility of mutual trust, and substitu-
Ƥ
ǣ-
lated in his own self-love and is hiding behind a false self image” (Staro-
͜͞͝͝ǣͤ͟ȌǤǯ-
ǣǢǡǤ
ȋͥͤ͟͝ǣͤ͞͝Ȍ	ǡǯ
Internet the example of the emptiness of self-love?
ǡǡ
he will not articulate an individualist elaboration of jusnaturalism. This 
ơ
ǤơǤ

ǡǤ
ǡǯǤ
rights in the name of a new possibility of social freedom. Except that 
ǡǡơǤ
social contract is not the foundation of civil society. It is a necessary de-
terrent against the evils caused by this society. The contract comes later 
and it questions the possibility of, almost, rediscovering the conditions 
of our freedom and our nature in civil society. The importance of moral 
Ǥ-
Ƥǡ-
ǡ-
ds as a creation of the common will. Natural equality is substituted by 
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the moral equality, that is the message of the Social ContractǤ
says, and this is very important to understand in order to be able to eva-
ǯǣǲơ
the will of all and the general will; the latter considers only the common 
interest, while the former takes private interest into account, and is no 
ǤǳȋǤǣ͢͠Ȃͣ͠Ȍ
ȋ͜͜͜͞ǣͣ͡ȌǤ
We are giving up our rights not in the name of an authority, as in Ho-
bbes, but in the name of this general will, in the name of all. This could 
   Ǥ-
usseau we can already talk about the sovereignty of the people. This 
overcoming, however, of the particular does not necessarily lead to the 
ƥǡ ǡ
submission to the general will. We have to understand the sovereignty 
-
Ǥ
higher freedom. In the Natural State we are free because there are no 
laws. In the Civil State we are free because we obey the laws that we our-
ȋǤǣͣ͟Ȃͣ͠ ȌǤǯ 
ǣǲ-
ral freedom... What he gains is the civil liberty and the property of all he 
Ǥǳȋͥͤ͟͝ǣ͟͢Ȍ
 
on how to read his argument. One criticism comes from Hegel, and the 
other one from Nietzsche. One closes the understanding of Modernity, 
and the other opens the way for a possible break from Modernity. The 
ǯơ
freedom which does not put freedom in the natural context. Kant initia-
ǣ
ǡǤǡ
Ǥǯǡ
that freedom can only be social. In his History of Philosophy, exactly in 
ǡ-
ing is not abandoned in the State, but on the contrary, it is constituted in 
ȋͥͤ͢͝ǣͣ͟͜ȌǤ
develop the discussion around individuals. Perhaps Hegel does not think 
ǡǡ
the Philosophy of Rightǣ
on individuals and their will, articulated in the contract. This part of the 
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Ǥ
Ǥ
Ǥǫ
ơǤ
concept and not a contingency. Hegel’s philosophy is determined by con-
cepts. We need to understand, he says in the Philosophy of Right, that 
ơȋ͜͜͞͡ǣͥ͟ȌǤ
The spiritual is the foundation of right (Das Geistige ist der Boden dês 
RechtsȌȋǤǣ͠ ͝ȌǤ
profound domination of positivism, in which the jusnaturalist inspirati-
on was lost. The profound crisis of law is, just as the word implies, in the 
lack of understanding of its own foundation. The baseless foundation of 
law. This is not the place to follow this reading. In the end, Hegel does 
not need to appear as a reference. The discussion can be articulated with 
ǣ	Ǥ
this way, Hegel thinks that he opens the possibility to understand the 
ȋǤ͜͜͞͠ǣ͝͝Ȃ͞͠ȌǤ
ǡǤ
the History of Philosophyǡ
that those who reject thought when talking about freedom do not know 
ȋͥͤ͢͝ǣͤ͟͜ȌǤǡ
ǡȋǤȌǤȋǤǡ
ǤǤȌǤǯ
message. The thought in matter is not an isolated act, distant from the 
world. It is a mediation; a historic one, even. With this mediation the 
universal aspect of the thought is mediated with the particularism of the 
ǡƤǤ
	ǡ
recognized as such, where the individual and the universal united. Thus, 
	Ǥ
way, Hegel thinks, freedom is realized in the social context. The social, 
which does not even appear in the Greek context, is what realizes or con-
stitutes us here in Modernity. This constitutive role of the social became 

ǡƤ
it. Here politics constitutes metaphysics.
In this sense, Hegel maybe thinks, we can overcome the doubts that 
ǡ
or perhaps the signal of totalitarianism. I think that Starobinski takes 
ǣ ǲȑǤǤǤȒ   -
ral ǡǣ
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ǯǤǳ
ȋ͜͞͝͝ǣͣ͠ȌǤ
	Ƥǡ
is, Hegel thinks, only how to understand this equality. Hegel is still far 
from a diagnosis which reveals the profound inequality in modern ca-
ǤǡƤ
confront the Hegelian conviction that Modernity realized our freedom. 
Again, we are free as modern beings, Hegel thinks.
Nietzsche’s criticism, expressed, for example, in Twilight of the Idols is 
not an apology of Modernity, but one of its strongest criticisms. Whe-
   Ƥ  ǡ  Ǥ ǲǡ 
Ƥǡcanaille in one person... to ask this once 
ǡǫǳȋ͞ ͜͜͜ǣ͝ ͜͢Ȍ-
re is no foundation of human nature, that is why it is not clear where 
Ǥ
of the human being leaves doubts which reach to present day.Ͷ I hate, 
ǡǣǲǨ
ȑǥȒǣseems to be preached by 
ǡǤǤǤǳǤȋ͜͜͜͞ǣ
ͣ͜͝ȌǤ-
Ǥƥǡ-
nity perhaps achieves its failure. Why do we still yearn to be Modern?
But let’s go back to Modernity and try to understand the arguments that 
speak in its favor. That is the case, as we saw, of the Hegelian philosophy. 
Hegel is so enthusiastic about Modernity that he cannot imagine anyt-
hing beyond it. His well known message is that as modern beings we 
ǤǤ
us go back to the beginning of theoretic Modernity which, in a way, we 
identify with jusnaturalism. An excerpt from the Encyclopedia can give 
ǤǣǲǮǯǡ-
losophy of right involves the ambiguity that it may mean either right as 
something existing ready-formed in nature, or right as governed by the 
nature of Things, i.e. by the notion. The former used to be the common 
ǡƤature, in which 
the law of nature should hold sway; whereas the social and political sta-
Ƥ
6 On the one hand I can mention Foucault´s reading of Nietzsche, thinking gene-
ǡ±ƲǤ
ǣǡ²
Ʋǡǣǡǡͥͣ͟͝ǡǤ͠͡Ȃ͢͡Ǥ
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natural rights. The real fact is that the whole law and its every article are 
based on free personality alone — on self-determination, which is the 
very contrary of determination by nature. The law of nature — strictly 
so called — is for that reason the predominance of the strong and the 
reign of force, and a state of nature a state of violence and wrong, of 
which nothing truer can be said than that one ought to depart from 
it. The social state, on the other hand, is the condition in which alone 
ǣƤ
Ǥǳȋͥͥ͝͡ǣͤͥ͞Ȍͷ The 
state of nature in which the new theoretical sense of Modernity is be-
ƥǤ
rights, thinks Hegel. The question of right is a social context. The sen-
se of right is the relation with others. Hegel thinks that things are that 
Ǥǣ
one is historical, which Hegel understands as the way out of nature and 
ƥǡǡǡ-
cept, a conceptual articulation of the thought. The way of freedom and 
the way of thought. These are two inseparable Hegelian perspectives. 
ǣǤ
on the other hand Hegel wants to analyze the logic of thought which 
leads to concept. From the beginning Hegelian philosophy is an inti-
mate relationship between ontology and logic. Except that his onto-
logy will not be the Greek one. Although full of admiration for Greek 
thought, Hegel does not agree with a presupposed primacy of general 
ƤǤ-
ƥǡǡ
and not postulating it. The primacy of the collective has to be the con-
sequence of the concept itself. On the other hand, Hegel is confronted 
ƥǡ-
ked to the advance of liberalism. He thinks about another synthesis of 
the collective and the individual, but not in the sense of a new ecume-
nism. This relation has to be understood as a consequence of the con-
cept itself. Thus, the ontology which comes back is not Greek. It is the 
story of the concept itself, and not of an already determined static me-
taphysical structure. Hegel’s reasoning is easy. The pre-modern world is 
ǡƤǤ-
se of that, he several times names the context as the state of unhappy 
consciousness and humiliation of man, of man’s essence which always 
7 English text taken from ǣȀȀǤǤȀȀȀȀȀ
ȀǤ.
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remains outside of him. Perhaps the Jewish people are a better example 

Ǥ
ǡǡƤ
glow in the collective. Even so, Hegel links freedom only to Modernity. 
Perhaps at the very beginning of jusnaturalism is the theory of human 
rights. But this world – of which Hobbes is a witness – is the world of vi-
ǡƤ
mentioned paragraph. Here we have one more argument, related to the 
mentioned relation between logic and the ontology. We have to depart 
from the State of Nature, not only because of violence found there, but 
because in the natural law and the nature, according to Hegel, we only 
have the relationship with things and not with ourselves. Natural rights 
ƤǦ
human being which Hegel searches. Who are we? And even more, who 
	ǫ-
usness. Our self consciousness does not stay connected to nature, but to 
ǡ	Ǥ
not a place of the human being. That is why, as we mentioned, speaking 
about natural rights is even contradictory.
We ought to depart from nature. Kant is an important step on this path. 
     ǡ   
Kant comes in. It is the context of a relation not anymore with things, 
ǡǤƥ
Kant’s position, but also speaks about its limits. He mentions a speci-
ƤǤ-
stitutive, transcendental, but at the same time isolated from the world, 
Ǥƥ ǡǡ
ǡƤǤ
is why the ethical life outweighs morality. This is the path to an exteri-
ority of reason. It again passes through the natural context represented 
by the family and enters civil society, in the liberal context of individu-
als. Even though he criticizes the liberal individual isolated from reason, 
Hegel thinks that this is a necessary step for the realization of modern 
ǤƤ-
ssion about economics. It does not belong to the private world anymo-
re, it is the context of realization of individual necessities. The economy 
is civil society, and that does not exist in the Greek thought. Hegel will 
now confront civil society with individuality, thinking of a possible re-
conciliation between the individual and the general. The state overco-
mes economic problems, the misery of the world, Hegel thinks. We are 
Ƥ   	 
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recognition. At this point Hegel confronts Kant again. We saw that Kant 
comes to the reciprocity of the wills, talking about the right and the 
external conditions of our freedom. But Hegel thinks that Kant does not 
show, in an argumentative way, how this reciprocity is reached. Hegel’s 
solution is that the individual is realized as having purpose in himself 
by mutual recognition of individuals. He thus arrives at the idea that the 
ȋǤͥͥͣ͝ǣ͜͝͝ȌǤ
ƤȋȌȋ͜͜͞͡ǣȠͥ͞ȌǤ
It is important to understand that Hegel does not mean that the decisi-
on of recognition is a contingent decision for each of us. That would be 
the idea of the contract. The recognition is the example of realization 
of the spirit, and not a contingent decision. This is the moment to con-
sider the connection between logic and ontology in Hegel and perhaps 
think of some criticisms.
This is about the relation between the particular and the general. In the 
beginning there is the particular, any individual, for example. In this 
context, he still has not developed his full potential. We saw that only 
history shows what the human being is and what his potentials are. The 
truth about the human being is only at the end of this process. The par-
ticular as it is, remains abstract. Historical development is the concre-
tization of individual abstractness. It is the progress of our will that 
overcomes the isolation of the reason. Hegel associates this free will 
ǡ  ơ-
ȋǤǣȠͤ͝ȌǤǤ
ǡƪ
and thus reaching the concrete of reason. In nature we have the identity 
between the particular and the general. It is the case of animals. Howe-
ver, it is a given identity. In the case of humans the particular still is not 
the general, it is realized as the general. The context of this realization is 
history. History is the stage of the human being. The concept is this hi-
ƪǤ
self consciousness is the consciousness about freedom, about its objec-
tive realization. The path of thought and the path of freedom are the 
paths that start with the abstract particular and end with the concrete 
ǤǡǡȋǤǣȠ
ͤͤ͝ȌǡǤ
The Hegelian subject is not separated from the world, as in the Kantian 
sense. Its presence in the world, that is, its social aspect, creates another 
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historical perspective. The social self articulates the metaphysical con-
text, the background of historical events. The social, which is not even 
perceived by the Greeks, here has the role of constitutive subjectivity. 
Hegel criticizes Kant’s elaboration of subjectivity in which subjectivity 
still remains abstract. Subjectivity can only be understood as identity 
ȋǤǣȠ͟͝͞ȌǤ
So, instead of saying metaphysics and politics, in the sense of me-
taphysical constitution of politics, in Modernity we can say politics 
and metaphysics, that is, social conditions for the possibility of me-
taphysics. This is the structural change between the Tradition and Mo-
Ǥǡ	
individual as such, and not as something linked to natural characte-
ristics. Hegel represents the consciousness of this process. We can be 
conscious of this history of realization of social freedom only at its end. 
And we need this consciousness. In the end, what would it mean to be 
free and not to know it.
     ȋǤǣ Ƞ
͢͜͞ȌǤǯǤ
latter misses the historical elaboration of subjectivity and thus the onto-
logical articulation of freedom. The Greeks did not understand the hu-
ȋȌǡ
ȋǤǣȠͥ͜͞ȌǤǡ-
tity between the particular and general in economy. When thinking of 
economy, Hegel, it seems, remained contaminated with his own liberal 
articulation of economy. It is the space of atomized individuals which 
lacks general and political equality. Hegel perhaps does not see the po-
ssibility of another economy and of an economic intersubjectivity.
The property doesn’t belong to freedom of the will. Only the relation 
among the wills creates the space of freedom. Thus Hegel reaches only 
 Ǥ 
Plato understood very well the ethical life of Greeks thinking that the 
private property still is not the general principle, because it contains sla-
ȋǤǣȠͥ͞ȌǤǡǡ
unjust in itself. The human being does not exist only in himself, but is 
conscious of his freedom. The ethical life and recognition and thus the 
intersubjectivity is a political event. Hegel believes that this is realized 
	Ǥǯ-
tion are well known. Habermas is also basing his whole theory on this 
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impossibility of realization of intersubjectivity in Modernity. It is a po-
litical danger, as we will still see, to think that Modernity is the realiza-
tion of democracy or intersubjectivity. For Habermas there is still a po-
ssibility, which for many there is not, to see democracy in Modernity.
Abside from the question of intersubjectivity, we can also mention the 
ơǤǡ-

ȋͥͥͣ͝ǣͥ͞͞ȌǤǡ-
hor, one comes to the conclusion that the recognition of the other is the 
ơȋǤǣ͞͡ȌǤǡ-
ǡǡơ
ȋǤǣͥ͢ȌǤ
ȋǤǣͤ͡ȌǤ
for these motives in Hegel. The example that Williams is discussing is 
ơǤ
the State and the concept depend on the individual contingencies and 
decisions. The idea of the State is much more important, Hegel thinks. 
ơǡȋ-
͜͜͞͡ǣȠͣ͡ȌǤ
other, but within this glorious way of the spirit. It seems to me that 
at this point Hegel does not overcome Kant’s philosophy. In Kant we 
cannot think of the encounter with the other. The other is inside a re-
ƪȋͥͥͣ͝ǣ͟͟ȌǤ
ƪǤƥ-
countering the other reaches perhaps even Habermas. Moreover, just 
like Hegel, Habermas also does not look for an economic intersubjec-
tivity, but a political one. He thinks that Hegel remained only with the 
ȋͥͤ͝͡ǣ͟͠Ȃͥ͡Ȍǡ
the spirit, and that because of that the intersubjectivity project rema-
Ǥǡƥǡ
ǡǣ
of searching for intersubjectivity where it cannot happen? Modernity 
is not the world of intersubjectivity as Hegel thinks and as Habermas 
still believes.
ơǤ-
se Hegel will proclaim the end of history and the impossibility of social 
ơǤǤ
Ƥ-
ȋ͜͜͞͡ǣȠͣ͝͞ȌǤ
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perspective of the concept. Thus, we can conclude that Modernity does 
      ơǤ
 Ǥǯ
the other diagnosis of Modernity.
©
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